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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

LEONARD J. HUDSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

-vsFLOYD We DECKER,
Defendant and Respondent.

Brief of Appellant
RICHARD W. BRANN & DEAN N. CLAYTON
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Appellant
406 Kiesel Building, Ogden, Utah

*****************
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal by the Plaintiff-Appellant,
hereinafter called Plaintiff, from a judgment for
Defendant-Respondent, hereinafter called Defendant,
on a jury verdict directed by the Honorable Parley
Eo Norseth, District Judge, on the 24th day of
January, 1957, in the District Court of the Second
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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....

Judicial District, Weber County,

Utah~

Since the

record on appeal is in two parts, Plaintiff will
hereinafter refer to the transcript of evidence
as (T) and the balance of the record as (R)e
At the close of Plaintiff's case in chief,
Defendant moved the Court for a directed

v~t

(T. 86, 87), and the Court took the motion under
advisement until the afternoon session.

The record

does not show, but the writer is confident Defendant
will admit, that Defendant also rested and advised
the Court in chambers that no further evidence would
be offered on behalf of Defendant.

Since the facts

adduced in the record are undisputed, the question
of whether Defendant also rested is important only
in that possibly, if not probably, the\facts could
in no way be explained, varied or controverted by
Defendant.

Plaintiff's motion for a new trial was

denied by the Court on February 11, 1957.
Plaintiff and Defendant, employees of Ut' So
Hill Air Force Base, were temporarily assigned to
Larsen Air Force Base, MOses Lake, Washington, for
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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one month's duty extending from May 17~ 1955~ to
1
)
(T e .5 , ~'9 , 60 , 6.....
.
J une 17 , 1955

Defendant desired

.,

comp.:tny for the return trip to the partiet~v rE.sidsnce·3
in Utah and requested Plaintiff to ride 1111i th him

(To 6l)o

On June l7, 1955:; Plaintiff and Defendant.))

in Defendant Ys 1950 Plymouth

sedan~

drove from Ivf..ose.:;

Lake, Washington, to Spokane, \iashington, lodged
overnight and then, about

5~00

o<Jclock .AoMejl tTune 18,

1955, connnenced driving from Spokane, Washington.., to
the place of the accident complained of by Plaintiff

(Te

-

49-52)o

Defendant drove and Plaintiff 1~lC-L~ a. non-

paying guest passenger (To50, 61).,
On

~rune 18~

1955, about

1~00

o<Jc2.ock PoMo)l the

partief! had arrived at a point a.pproxima tely 44 miles
north of Salmon City, Idaho, and a,pproxLrnately 2 miles
soutb of the Summit of Lost Trail Pa:;,s, on Uo So
Highway

93,

within Lemhi County, Idaho (T., 44~

5l)o

T:te highway was paved and dry, visibility 1.rua.s clear·

and ·weather good, and the

t.~~~:rair._ 111BS

w.m.rrrt.a,inou:s

with moderate curving of the bighv.Jay (Te 6., 67, PJ..si.nti.ff·.'s EL1.ibits C, D a,nd E).,

The Defendant drc·ve
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his automobile south from the summit of Lost Trail

Pass at a speed between 30-40 miles per hour (Te 51),
about 2 miles south of the pass Defendant started to
slow down rounding a curve (Te 53), slowed down to
ttnot over ten miles an hour" on the second curve
(Te

54), continued to slow down to 5-10 miles an
highl~Y

hour (To 54) and then drove off the
ravine bordering the highway (T. 54,
Exhibits C, E and F).

into a

Plaintiff~s

Plaintiff's Exhibits B, F and

G show the condition of DefendantVs automobile after
it landed in the ravine.
Plaintiff's witnesses Harmon

W~

Cheney, Jame:s

Larsen and David Burt returning from Moses lake,
Washington, in Mr. larsen's automobile, s,aw tracks
running off the highway and then sa· Defendant <J s
1/{

automobile below (T. 6,

?). David Burt took the

photographs in evidence (To 11).

Harmon Cheney

testified that in the immediate vicinity of where
Defendant's automobile went off the highway there was
a 1'thin coat n of loose sanrl or fine gravel on the
paved highway (Te 21, 28), but that he was travelling
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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at 40 rr~les per hour in the right lane at this point
and had no difficulty whatsoever in negotiating the
curve (To 26, 27, 28)o
Plaintiff suffered severe injuries, including
a fractured vertebrae and right femur, and incurred
considerable medical expenses as a result of the
dent

(T~

7o-8l)o The medical

testL~ony

SQ Peery is omitted from the record (Re

acci~

of Dro Louis
13)~

Since

there is little chance of dispute as to Plaintiff·;s
receiving more than nominal personal injuries as a
result of the accident, the Plaintiff will confine
himself primarily to talking about the evidence
necessary to raise a question of fact on the issue
of reckless disregardo
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT Io
The Court erred in sustaining Defendant!s motion
·~for

a directed verdict and directing a verdict in

favor of Defendant and aga.i.nE:t Plaintiff upon tbe
ground and for the reason that. the undisputed evidence
in this cause was sufficient to raise a jury questionn
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ARGUMENT

Plaintiff appeals from a judgment for Defendant
on a directed

verdict~

Only Plaintiff offered

evidence in this case and such evidence is undisputedo
The rule is established in this state, that upon
Plaintiff's appeal from a judgment for Defendant on
a directed

~ct,

this Court will consider and

apply the evidence in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff's cause of 'action and every controverted
fact shall be resolved in Plaintiff's favor, Ae W.
Sewell v. Commercial Cas. Coo,
327; Jackson

Vo

Boskovich

Utah Const. Co.,

Vo

Po 2d 885, 886.

80 Utah 378, 15 Po 2d

Colston, 116 Utah 295, 209 Po 2d 566;
Utah --~:' 259

The question here resolves itself

into one of whether, after considering the evidence
in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, it would be
unreasonable
pleadingso

to find in favor of Plaintiff under the

Winchester v. Egan Farm Service, 4 Utah 2d

129, 288 Po 2d 790o

Stated another way,

" · o o if by admitting for the purposes
of the motion all facts which the evidence,
given a reasonable construction in favor of
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the adverse party, tends to support or prove,
it_ appears ,that all essential:- facts are
supported by evidence with respect to which
reasonable men may arrive at different con=
elusions, or the evidence is such that
reasonable minds may draw different inferences,
the motion should be denied and the case
submitted to the jurye n 53 Am. Juro, Trial,
Sec. 362; Accord: 61 CoJoSo Motor Vehicles,
Sec. 526.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are directly
descended from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
although they contain a few modifications to suit
local practice.

Rule 50 (b), UoRoCoPo, provides,

in substance, that whenever a motion for a directed
verdict is made at the close of the evidence and
denied for any reason, the trial court is deemed to
have submitted the cause to the jury subject to a
later determination of the legal questions involved.
The U. S. Circuit Court in Fratta

Vo

Grace Line

:;..ci

(C.C.Ao2d) 139 Fed.~743, 744, admirably states the
text authority and Federal view of the intent and
purpose of Rule 50 (b):
'~e take this occasion to suggest to
trial judges that, generally speaking-although there may be exceptions--it is
desirable not to direct a verdict at the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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close of the evidence, but to reserve
decision on any motion therefor, and to
allow the jury to bring in a verdict; the
trial judge may then, if he thinks it
improper, set aside the verdict as against
the weight of the evidence and grant the
motion, F.RoC.P., Rule 50 (b) o o o with
the consequence that if, on appeal, we
disagree with him, we will be in a position
to reinstate the verdict, thus avoiding the
waste and expense of another trial.,tt See
also: I~ss v. Pa. R. Co., 68 F., Suppo 740'
Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and
'
Procedure, Sec. 1076.
Few things are more devastating to a trial lawyer
than a directed verdict.

A jury verdict of no cause

of action can be explained to a client as the conelusion of eight reasonable persons of ordinary and
varying experience.

A directed verdict is the

conclusion of one person resulting from his attitudes
and experience alone.

Ordinarily, if a case is slim

on questions of law or liability, a jury verdict of
no cause of action kills the litigation for everyone
concerned.

A directed verdict usually requires an

appeal and, if the trial court was wrong, another
trial resulting in double expense to litigants and
the State and possible loss to PlaintiffVs cause by
lapse of time and loss of evidenceo

Ofttimes 1
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verdicts are directed in the heat of the trial and
under pressureo

If the issues be submitted to the

jury and then retained under advisement by the Court
for ten days, then surely there is time for calm and
dispassionate consideration and evaluation of the
record and the law, presumably giving rise to far less
chance of error and possibly cutting down the number
Rule 50 (b), UoRoCoPo, was

of appeals and retrialso

drawn in the light of such considerations" ·
Plaintiff's complaint alleged and the evidence
showed that Plaintiff was injured in the State of
Idaho while being transported by Defendant as a guest
(Ro l)o

The Idaho nguest statute," Seco 49-1001,

Idaho Code was pleaded and reads as follows:
''No person transported. by the o·wner or
operator of a motor vehicle as his guest
without payment for such transportation
shall have a cause for damages against
such owner or operator for injuries, death
or loss, in case of accident, unless such
accident shall have been intentional on
the part of the said owner or operator or
caused by his intoxication or his reckless
d_jisregard of the rights of otherso tt
After much confusion, the Idaho Supreme Court
crystallized a definition of "reckless disregardn as
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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follows~

'~he term 'reckless disregard' as used
in said section means an act or conduct
destitute of heed or concern for consequences; especially foolishly heedless of
danger, headlong rash; wanton disregard, or
conscious indifference to consequenceson
~ Foberg Vo Harrison, 71 Idaho 11, 225 Po 2d
V),69 71; Turner Vo Purdum, (Idaho), 289 Po
2d,608, 6ll,)and see other cases cited
thereino
~ __

This Court, in Shoemaker Vo Floor, 117 Utah 434, 217
P. 2d 382, recognized the Idaho view that reckless
means

'~o

hold the driver liable for a lesser degree

of negligence than an 'intentional! actn and in said
case this Court cited with approval Hughes

Vo

Hudelson,

67 Idaho 10, 169 P. 2d 712, which reversed a nonsuit
and held the evidence sufficient to make a prima
facie case.

In the Hughes case, supra, proof of a

45 mile speed together with physical facts showing
the host to have driven his vehicle partially on a
soft shoulder 360 feet before returning to the
highway and overturning, thereby killing the guef't,
"constitute sufficient proof to make a prima facie
case to put the Defendant on hi,s prooflllo
The only issue in this ca8e at the bar is
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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whether-Plaintiff's undisputed evidence was sufficient
to go to the jury for·determination of the ultimate
issues raised by the pleadings.,

What constitutes

reckless.disregard is a question of fact, each case
standing to. a large extent on its own bottom and,
therefore, decided cases being of little aid in
resolving the questiono
Fo 2d 937, 938o

Von Lackum

Vo

o<:

Allan, 219 /

Plaintiffts evidence of ''reckless

disregard n is· undisputed, but almost wholly circumstantialo

However, as noted in 20 Amo Juro, Evidence,

Seco 11$9, "In many instances facts can be proved
only by circumstantial eviQ.ence, and in some instances
even though .there is direct testimony, the circumstantial evidence given may outweigh, or be more
convincing than direct or positive testimonyott
MCCormick, Law of Evidence (1954), Seco 306,
discusse.s. burden of producing evidence in a clear and
sound rnannero

He points out that in the usuaJl civil

case, the Plaintiff passes through three stages of
judicial hospitality:

(1) where if Plaintiff stops,

he will be thrown out of Court; (2) where if Plaintiff
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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'!frl

,/

stops and Defendant does nothing !J the issues are
submitted to the jury' and (3) where if Plaintiff
stops and Defendant does nothing, a verdict. will be
directed in Plaintiff\?s favor"

Strictly speaking,

the burden of going forward does not shift until
':;tage three since Defendant can refuse to go forward

and yet not suffer a directed
threeo

verdict~

until stage

It is PL?.intifftis contention in this case

tb..at Plaintiff clearly arrived safely at stage two,
although there may be room for argument as to whether
Plaintiff arrived at stage three,
ly

~.s::'erts

PLa..intiff vigorous=

that a reasonable jury could infer the

fact of Defendant 11 s ''reckl.e:ss disregard n from the
undisputed evidence presentedo
The Defendant, as an adverse witness, testified.
that he drove his automobile from the s-ummi.t of LoRt
Trail Pass at a speed between

30~40

miles per hour

(Te 53 )P that he slowed do·wn tn "not ove!'' ten mile;:-;
an hour-n rounding the curve immediately preceding tt.&
modeet curve on which the acciden-t occurred (Te 5.3),.
that he continued to sl::~~~~~· dmllln to 5-10 mi.le•-:: per hour
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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{To 54) and that he then drove off the b.ighway into
tt:e deep ravine below {To

D, E and F)o

54,

Plaintiffvs Exbibits C,

No reason or explanation wa.s at any

time given by Defendant as to w.hy h~, drove off the
high"w:s,y a

At the pl9.ce where Defendant

dr~ove hi~

automobile

off the highway, the weather was good and visibil.i ty
clear~ and the highway 1r1as paved and dry

Pl7bi.ntiff t~ s Exh..ibi V:: C, D and E) o

(To 6, 67,

Plaintiff 11 s

Exhibit.::. C, D and E clearly show that the curve at
this point was considerably lesE: th.3.n severeo
there

141as

a thin coat of sand or

grC~,vel

True,

on the

h.igh~~

way, but this did not interf8re 1dt.h tl:e negotiation
of this curve at forty miles per .hour by
witnes~

Pl.~3.intiff Yis

Harmon Cheney a few minutes after Defenda,nt

drove off the highway (To 2.1., 2:.61} 27 ~ 28)o

In any

case, there is not a scintillh o.f evidence in

case tha.t such sand or gravt:,1

.ir~terfex-,ed

tb.i~:'.

1ffd.th

De-fendant <J,s operation of his autorrJC·b:l.le or tha,t there
l~E:..s

any other intervening agency that c.8,used.

De~fendant

to drive off the hi.ghw.s.y...,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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c~:::,:::e,

Ordinarily in a gue,,e;t
cL~iming

excessive speed..,

In thE- ca:2e &t the
ex.ce<~f'.i.ve ~pe6d"

Plij,intiff dos<::- not claim
according to
~modest

the PLaintiff i::J

Defendant·~":' te~t.imony,

that only intentioru:ll

~he

but

t.h3,t~

speed w.a.s o=·o

Dr reckle~::;

could. h-ave brough a.:Qout this accidente

bar~,

di ..::rrega.rd

There is

abe.olutely no evidence of an intervening agency
bringing about the
Idaho

drivi~f

the bighway.

Th&

~aee ~on v. Mootz. 253 P~the . • tJ{

Utb.h ca.seSI Riccuiti

Vo

Rob?nm, 2 Utah 2d. 45:; 269

P" 2d 282, bot.h argued vigorously to the trial court
by Ddfend.ant, do not have any r·el.ev:s.nee or

tion to this case at thB
inte.r·vening a,gencies,

::J,

bc:~r be~au:::;e

both inYolve

horse in the first case and

or the driver looking fc!" &..n infl:6ct

~or

cig,;trette ar"e

.sJl instance1:1 of intervening ag6ncie:3 t 1-·2-t
awc;~,y

what otherwise might

reckless dis:r-ega,rd..,

applica~

b~

expl~in

intentional conduct. or

In the i.n&tant case, it. is

again emphasized that there

i~;

no evidence

·wh~,t~-.ce.v6:r
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of a.n intervening agency gi·vi.ng rise to an explanation
of why Defendant drove off the hi.gh"lllray ::J.t the time

and place alleged by Pla.intiff"
The case of Hebert v"' Allen, (Io·wa) 4l NcWo 2d
240, sums up

position in. this

ca3e~

In

the Hebert case, Defendant was travelling

1.5~20

miles

Plaintiff~s

per hour on a straight road and suddenly"q lAlithout
lmown reason, swerved from the highway into a telephone
pole, thereby injuring Pls.i.ntiff llllho
fend.ero

wa.~

The Iowa. Supreme Court reversed

verdict and, among other things,

riding on the

a.5''1
directed

said~

"But though the doctrine of rr::.s ipsa may
not apply, it was not for the court to
imagine possible explanr.:ttions other than
the obvious one of reck.les,sness:o The day
was clear and bright, there w~s no other
vehicle in sight, the terrain 1rr~.s flat,
there is no evidence of any unusual :Street
condition, the car was apparently under the
driveris complete control a m.~tter of seconds
before the "accident,n no dive::-ting circum~
stances are shownc When the car started to
swerve one of the passengers said to the
other nHe is probably trying to sc.s.re uso n
That was the natural explanation that came
to the mind of one 'Wi tnGsi~~ a~' ::'1 part of the
reE' gestaeo It is a reasonable one under
this Recordo As ·was said in ~ite y, Center,
supra, 218 Iowa, at p~ge 1033, 254 N~Wo at
page 92g 1tl,ve have no eviden~-s on the part
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of the Defendant, and, if w·e are to indulge
the imagination and conjure posc.:ibiJities 9

there is practically no limit to wruch we

may not goe ~f- -r.- ~~ If, before the Plaintiff
can rre,ke out a case, he must negative every
pos.sibili ty ·lArbich might relieve the Defendant.
from liability, it would be practically
impoE:sible to establish a case of negligence
or recklessness against the driver of any
automobileo Surelyjl this is not the laY~ro
111N either court nor jury has any ·way to
learn the mental attitude of the drive:t"
except by inference from his conducto As
.~1,id in Mescher Ve Brogan, 223 Iowa 573, 581,
272 NoWo 645, 650~ nrt is the action and
conduct ~- ~~- * that measure the degree of
care and determines ·whether or not one i'3
proce'~ding ~*" * ~r with a heedless d.is.regard
for
the rights of other sou
nnefendants would have us hold there
wa'3 no e·vidence here as to the driver~s
"actions and conduct n from which an
inference of recklessneE:3 could be dra;11\lno
This we cannot doe The movement of the
car, under the Record presented 'I ·rAlcUB some

***

evidenc~

of the conduct of the drivero

This

is not to say ttres ipsa loquitur on It would
be just as true if the ca,r had ne:ver struck
the pole-if there had been no ".:tccidentett
r~e have said that while no presumption
of negligence arises from the mere fact of
injury, nsuch presumption mSty and often does

arise from the nature of the cause or ms.nner
0f the injuryo" Cahill Vo Illinq:i,s Central
Ro Coo, 148 Io·wa 241, .246, 125 No1rlo 331, 332,
28 LoRo.Ao NoSo J llLJ_o
UThe statute creates liability for
injury due to "reckless operation" of the
caro Certainly the jury cou.ld r..ave found.
unde:!" this Record that the car was being
jl
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by Defendant Hildebrand.o ~.nd whether
such operation was reckless was clearly a
jury questiono
uwe b,ave e.x;amined all the cases cited by
Defendant in support of the court vs rulingo
Our deci.~ion here does not run counter to the
ruling in any of theme n

operat~q

JL'1.other case in point is Doheny v.., Coverdale,
(Monte) 68 Po 2d 142, where the guests ·were killed
and only circumstantial evidence ·was available
indicating the automobile was driven off the road
into a tree "Vl.ri.thout reason showing,

The Court held

the circumstantial evidence sufficient to raise a
jury question on the issue of gross negligence and
reckles3 operationo

Also

~

194 SoWo .2d 976-, Orico

556.

Vc

see-Thom~son Vo

Kost (Kyo)

Williams., (Conno) 97 -Ao 2d

~-+.rr0....._
.Assume, for purpose of discussion only, that

Defendant did in fact consciously and intentionally
drive his automobile off the embankment in this caseo
What further proof could Plaintiff

produ~e

intentional conduct in this case?

Presu.mabJ..y, on a.

o.f such

direct quee.tion, Defendant would empha tico.lly deny
such intent.ional conduct, yet the denial -would not
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change the ultimate

fact~

Who; besides the Defendantj

on this earth can possibly know the mental workings
of Defendant vs mind at the time he drove off the
embankmento

As a practical matter,

reaso~~ble

men

must determine a man vs intent from all the facts and
circumstances surrounding the incident in questiono
If the facts point in one direction, then the burden
should shift to the Defendant to sho·w additional facts
pointing in another direction.

Psychiatrists have long

recognized that more than a few automobile accidents
are intentional in that they are the result of conscious or subconscious feelings of aggression, guilt
or

self~estructiono

The question, as in this case,

is how far an injured claimant must go in proving such
intentional conduct by circumstances in order to
raise a jury

question~

There is no dispute in the evidence regarding
Plaintiffts severe injuries, including a. fractured
vertebrae and right femur, and extensive medical
treatment and hospitalization (To 70-81 incG) and
medical expenses exceeding $1,000o00

(Pl=Lint.iff~s
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Exhibits A and H)e

Little more need be said on

Plaintiff's medicals since the Court directed its
verdict for failure of proof on the issue of
reckless disregard (To 88, 89)o

CONCLUSION
The evidence was sufficient to go to the jury
on the issue of Defendant's "reckless disregard"
where the undisputed evidence showed Defendant drove
his automobile off the highway into a deep ravine
below, without explanation or reason given, while
operating his automobile at a speed reduced from

35-40 miles per hour to 5-10 miles per hour on a
dry paved highway with visibility good and only a

modest curve at the point of leaving the highwayo
Respectfully submitted.,
Richard W. Brann
Dean No Clayton
Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Appellant
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